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Trashing Developing Nations: The Global
Hazardous Waste Trade
"The tragedy of mankind may prove to be the inability to adapt its modes
of behavior to the products of its intellect. Twentieth-century man threat-
ens to be a new kind of dinosaur, an animal suffering from a brain ill-
adjusted to its environment."'
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Hazardous Export Trade
In the United States, and throughout the industrialized nations of
the world, there is grave concern over the dangers associated with the
management of advanced chemical technology2 and its most infamous
byproduct-hazardous waste.3 Citizens of industrialized countries are
painfully aware of the tragic consequences and potential disasters that
result when hazardous products are dealt with in a cavalier manner.4
1. W. FRIEDMANN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 120 (1971).
2. Langone, Waste: A Stinking Mess, TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 44 (In this issue, planet Earth is
recognized as TIME'S "Man of the Year").
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1988). The stat-
ute defines hazardous waste as any solid waste or combination of solid waste that may "cause, or
significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapaci-
tating reversible, illness; or... pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed."
Id.
The definition of solid waste covers garbage, refuse, sludge, and other discarded material, includ-
ing solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material, resulting from industrial commercial min-
ing, and agricultural operations. Id § 6903(27).
4. Perhaps the most widely recognized and tragic example of this is the Hooker Chemical and
Plastics Corporation's chemical waste dump in the Love Canal area of Niagara Falls, New York.
Over a period of twenty years, Hooker Chemical dumped millions of barrels of chemical waste into
the abandoned canal. The land was back-filled, houses were constructed and families moved in. By
1978, the chemical wastes had seeped into basements of nearby homes and oozed to the ground
surface. Over 200 families were evacuated. Many developed serious health problems including can-
cer and kidney disease. See Brown, Love Canal and the Poisoning of America, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Dec. 1979, at 33.
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case. Woburn, Massachusetts has one of the highest rates of
leukemia in America. Eleven of the seventeen children who have died from that cancer live within
half a mile of two wells contaminated by a chemical dump. See Angier, Hazards of a Toxic Waste-
land Learning to Cope with High-Tech Risks, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 32.
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The tragedy of Bhopal' demonstrates that similar horrors are increas-
ingly a part of the life experience for citizens of lesser developed coun-
tries ("LDCs") as well.
Industry produces an estimated 400 million tons of hazardous waste
annually.6 The Uited States is the largest contributor generating over
274 million tons.7 The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
asserts that the figure is actually twice as high, nearly 575 million tons.8
Most hazardous waste is chemical waste and every year roughly 1,000
new chemicals join the 70,000 already in daily use.9 Less than two per-
cent have been tested for possible side effects.10 As domestic disposal fa-
cilities near capacity or are abandoned as overly dangerous, and NIMBY
(Not In My Backyard)11 syndrome becomes the rallying cry for commu-
5. Bhopal has been called "the worst industrial accident in history." Robertson, Introduction to
the Bhopal Symposium, 20 TEx. INT'L L.J. 269 (1985).
On December 4, 1984, methyl isocyanate vapor escaped from a pesticide plant operated by Union
Carbide India Ltd. Nearly 2,500 people were killed almost immediately. Victims continue to die at
the rate of one a day. The Indian government estimates the death toll has reached 3,329. See Wall
St. J., Feb. 15, 1987, at A15, col. I.
6. WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE 1987, MANAGING HAZARDOUS WASTE: THE UNMET
CHALLENGE 201-02 (1987).
7. See Porterfield & Weir, The Export of US. Toxic Wastes, 254 THE NATION 325 (1987)
(According to Government Accounting Office Figures, the amount rose from about 9 million metric
tons in 1970 to at least 274 million in 1984).
8. See Biden, A New Direction for Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Prevention, Not Dis-
posal, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10400 (Oct. 1987) (The figure is based on data compiled by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment).
9. See Nomani, Health Risks Increased By Hazardous Waste Disposal, Study Says (Press Release
by Reuters Northern European Service) (Apr. 15, 1987).
10. See Angier, supra note 4, at 32. See also McClosky, Debating the Problems that Underlie
Pollution Control Problems, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413, 10415 (Oct. 1988):
Of the 600 chemicals in pesticides suspected of causing cancer or birth defects, EPA has
banned only 32, and is investigating only a couple of dozen each year. With 20 percent of
the drinking water supplies of this country possibly contaminated with chemicals, EPA
has set limits for only 2 of the chemicals. EPA has regulated only 10 percent of those
wastes recognized as hazardous under the RCRA.
11. See Bula, Toxic Waste: Whose Problem is it?, BC BUSINESS, May 1987, at 27. There is a
very low degree of public trust for waste disposal facility operators. Although hazardous waste
disposal is a potential economic bonanza, an intense fear of hazardous waste disasters makes the
likelihood of community acceptance of a waste disposal facility highly unlikely. Bula provides an
incisive analysis of the NIMBY phenomenon:
The public in B.C. has a mental image of those involved in the toxic waste business:
More evil than Lex Luthor. More devious and conniving than Machiavelli. More ruth-
less than Stalin. Untrustworthy, sneaky, and a menace to babies, animals, plants, and
the universe.... Those in the toxic waste business have a name for the public's allergic
reaction. In the tone of voice of someone repeating a joke told many times--one that is
hardly funny anymore-they call it NIMBY syndrome. Not In My Back Yard.
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nity's opposition to local disposal facilities, the developing nations12 of
the world become an attractive site for illicit disposal of hazardous waste
generated by U.S. and European multinational corporations ("MNCs").
The MNCs can avoid increasingly strict regulatory standards and grow-
ing costs associated with proper hazardous waste disposal at home, by
shipping them to debt burdened developing countries that lack the infra-
structure and regulations necessary to handle waste yet are in desperate
need of hard currency to fuel their economies. 3 Although many LDCs
have environmental protection agencies, most do not possess the regula-
tory framework, treatment and disposal facilities necessary to handle
hazardous waste. 4 MNCs can externalize the costs of safe disposal by
shipping wastes to developing nations unaware of the potential for latent
disaster caused by improper disposal. One particularly insidious poten-
tial danger is seepage, which poisons soil and water, and may be linked to
cancer as well as birth defects. 5
The export and improper .disposal of hazardous waste creates not
only health and environmental problems for ourselves and future genera-
12. For purposes of this comment the terms 'developing nation' or 'lesser developed country'
(LDC) are used alternatively to encompass:
the developing States, the underdeveloped States, the non-aligned States, the poor States,
the newly-independent States, the micro-States, the afflicted States. To lump them into a
generic 'Other' such as 'Third World' is to paper over the serious problems with a pat-
tern of convenient predisposition, to sweep their problems under a rug.
See K. Highet, Remarks at the June Program in Foreign Law of the Parker School of Foreign and
Comparative Law at the Law School of Columbia University, note 1 (June 10, 1987) (available at
Columbia University Law Library).
13. See Shue, Exporting Hazards, 27 ETmics 579, 586-87 (1981); Comment, Hazardous Exports
In The Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double Standard, 12 COLUM. J. ENCVTL. L. 71, 72
(1987) ("[ilndustry, faced with the higher costs of doing hazardous business, is tempted to relocate in
Third World countries where its activities would be subjected to little or no regulation.").
14. See Bordewich, The Lessons of Bhopal: The Lure of Foreign Capital is Stronger than Envi-
ronmental Worries, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1987, at 33. Most environmental protection agen-
cies in developing nations are "understaffed, underfunded, and overruled in policy debates by
economic planners who still see development and safety as mutually exclusive goals." Id. See also
Margarinos de Mello, General Guidelines for an Environmental Policy and a Preliminary Case Study
in a Developing Country, 4 INDUSTRY & ENV'T 53 (1983). Margarinos de Mello succinctly summa-
rized the situation in most developing nations by stating "[alnybody can throw away anywhere at
any time and in any quantity." Id.
15. See, Magnuson, The Poisoning of America, TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 58. See also Epstein &
Briggs, If Rachel Carson Were Writing Today: Silent Spring in Retrospect, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10180 (June, 1987):
Much cancer today reflects events and exposure in the 1950s and 60s. Production, use,
and disposal of synthetic organic, and other carcinogens were then minuscule compared
to current levels which will determine future cancer rates for younger populations now
exposed. There is every reason to anticipate that the high current cancer rates will be
dwarfed in coming decades.
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tions, it is also a source of extreme tension and animosity between the
United States and the developing nations of the world. It carries poten-
tially catastrophic environmental and foreign policy implications. The
inevitable backlash 6 to indiscriminate waste dumping by MNCs has be-
come a burning global issue. The developing nations have exploded in
scandal and rage from revelations of illicit unsafe dumps and schemes by
MNCs to dump waste in their territories. The international environmen-
tal protection group, Greenpeace, has presented a list of 115 cases docu-
menting export of hazardous waste from Europe and the United States to
LDCs. 7 This figure is believed to represent only a fraction of the global
trade involving hazardous waste.
A plan by Detroit industrialists to export 4 million of U.S. auto-
industry hazardous waste was recently discovered.18 The arrangement
would have allowed Lindaco Inc. of Delaware to ship waste to Guinnea
Bissau for payment of $300 million spread over five years.19 The payment
would have amounted to twice the country's gross national product.20
The deal represented a potential savings of millions for Lindaco Inc.
Landfilling hazardous waste in the U.S. costs more than $100 per ton and
incineration can cost up to $500 a ton.21 The company would have paid
less than $80 a ton to Guinnea-Bissau.
On the island of Kassa off Conakry, capital of the West African
nation of Guinea, children played on top of a 15,000 ton mountain of
toxic ash contaminated by dioxins and heavy metals from an incinerator
in Philadelphia.2 In Logos, Nigeria near Esravos and Forados,"3 rusty
16. See Exporting Poisons, The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 13, 1980, at 24. This editorial
seemingly predicted the present dilemma. "It is not hard to imagine a future backlash from third
world peoples outraged by what would certainly appear to them to be a callous disregard for their
health and well-being." Id.
17. Greenpeace Wants Ban on Dumping Toxic Waste in Third World (Press Release by The
Xinhua General Overseas News Service) (June 16, 1988).
18. See Hazardous Waste; Rep. Conyers Submits Bill To Block Export of Toxic, Municipal
Wastes Incinerator Ash, Daily Report For Executives (BNA) No. 134 (July 13, 1988) [hereinafter
Conyers Bill to Block Export].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (These figures are estimates based on statements of an official with Waste Management
Inc.).
22. See Williams, Dangerous Elements Found in Ash Shipped from Philadelphia: Dumping of
Toxic Waste in West Africa Raises Concerns, L.A. Times, May 29, 1988, at 30, col. 1. "Dioxins are
carcinogenic byproducts of the incineration of plastics and synthetic materials." The heavy metal
concentrated in the ash includes cadmium, copper, nickel and lead. When asked about the toxicity
of the ash, a European based toxicologist replied, "'I certainly would not want my children playing
on this dump in Guinea.'" Id. See also Helmore, Dumping on Africa: West Exports its Industrial
Wastes, The Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1988, at 1. This article described how A.S. Bulk
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steel drums containing hazardous industrial byproducts are stacked be-
hind a family compound.24 In the port city of Koko, Nigeria more than
1,000 tons of foul-smelling waste was dumped in containers too hot to
touch.2"
Africa is not the only port of entry for the hazardous waste trade.
In 1985, a Delaware trasport company, Ecotherm, was hired by T.R.W.
Inc. of Redondo Beach, California to ship 205 cylinders of poisonous
corrosive gases to Costa Rica. 6 The Costa Rican government denied
entry to the shipment after asking U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") officials for information about the corrosive materi-
als.27 Ecotherm then sued the EPA officials for obstructing trade. The
Federal court case was dismissed for lack of evidence.2 8
As Abbott Laboratories pharmaceutical dumps in Puerto Rico
reached capacity, waste containing antibiotics and fish oil were exported
to the Dominican Republic for use as cattle feed and fertilizer.2 9 The
Dominican Institute for Bioconservation has determined that ingestion
by humans can cause hormonal disorders, birth defects, and severe intes-
tinal illnesses, particularly among children.
The grave potential to the environment and American foreign policy
are readily apparent from these shocking and tragic examples of the haz-
ardous waste export trade. Toxic waste from U.S. MNCs has been dis-
covered in Brazil, Haiti, Guinea, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe;30 major dumpsites have been planned for Guinea-Bissau,
Handling Inc. dumped this load as the first shipment of what was originally intended to be a delivery
of 85,000 tons. The ash was marketed and sold as "raw materials for bricks" and was dumped in an
abandoned quarry on Kassa. Government investigators determined the material was toxic after the
island's vegetation shriveled. Guinea protested; the waste company has sent a ship to remove the
ash.
23. These place names are Portuguese for "slave" and "indentured." This is sadly ironic be-
cause many citizens of developing nations view hazardous exports as part of a continuing legacy of
exploitation. Brooke, Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1988, at 1, col.
2.
24. See Press Release by the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (July 23, 1988). Villagers in
Lagos and Forados have been warned not to harvest crops or locally grown fruits and vegetables due
to contamination from the seeping barrels of waste chemicals.
25. Baldwin, Italian Ecologists 41armed by Exports of Waste to Third World (Press Release by
Reuters) (June 15, 1988). The Syrian ship Zanoobia carried the waste back to Italy in April. The
waste was held by "weak, second-hand drums" and "the fumes were overpowering." Id.
26. Porterfield & Weir, supra note 7, at 343.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (The Dominican Republic now prohibits the importation of pharmaceutical waste, cate-
gorizing it as a human health hazard).
30. Conyers Bill To Block Export, supra note 18.
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Guyana, Panama, the Congo, Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Bahamas, Ethio-
pia, Benin, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela.31
Dubbed "garbage imperialism"32 by leaders of developing nations,
the hazardous export trade is the result of MNCs attempting to avoid
rising costs associated with rigorous safety standards and disposal re-
quirements in industrial nations. "Like water running downhill, hazard-
ous waste invariably will be disposed of along the path of least resistance
and expense. Conditions are ripe for finding 'safe havens' for hazardous
waste around the globe."'33 With ever increasing proclivity, MNCs have
demonstrated a willingness to externalize or socialize the costs of chemi-
cally-based products. 34 Consumers must share the blame for this short-
sighted outlook. The driving force behind this strategy of minimizing
short term costs at any price, including degradation of the human envi-
ronment through mass production of hazardous waste, is the culture of
consumerism-the insatiable desire for cheap, disposable products in a
throw-away culture.35 Hazardous waste will be exported and disposed of
in an ecologically unsound manner, and developing nations will continue
to be treated as the industrial world's trash bin, as long as they continue
to provide a supply of open markets for hazardous waste that allow
MNCs to externalize costs and avoid disposal regulations and liability for
harm caused by wastes.
B. A Strategy to Manage the Hazardous Export Trade
The developing countries of the world are autonomous, sovereign
nations and must be allowed to enter contractual relations with U.S.
MNCs. 36 The MNCs, however, should not be able to negotiate contracts
31. Baldwin, supra note 24.
32. See Italy Bans Waste Exports to Third World (Press Release by The Reuters Library Report)
(Sept. 7, 1988) (the term was coined by Kenyan officials).
33. See Conyers Bill To Block Export, supra note 18.
34. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
508 (1961) ("[n]ot charging an enterprise with a cost which arises from it leads to an understatement
of the true cost of producing its goods; the result is that people purchase more of those goods than
they would want if their true costs were reflected in the price."). See also Shue, supra note 13, at
586. From the perspective of an individual corporation, costs are socialized "by retaining a technol-
ogy that imposes hidden costs on workers and on whoever pays their medical bills, instead of switch-
ing to a safer technology the costs of which might have to be passed on to consumers or absorbed by
the firm." Id
35. See Kidder, Abuse of the Environment, The Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1988, at 134
(reflecting that an "obscene avariciousness" characterizes our society. In American society, "we
consume material culture, use it up, waste it.").
36. See Magraw, Transboundary Harm The International Law Commissions Study of "Interna-
tional Liability," 80 Am. J. INT'L. L. 305, 325 (1986) (The developing nations are autonomous
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allowing them to avoid liability for harm by exporting wastes to develop-
ing nations. U.S. MNCs must be held responsible for damages caused by
waste they generate. The fundamental premise of this comment is that
we cannot continue to export technologically advanced petrochemical in-
dustry and hazardous wastes without also providing legal recourse for
damages that result when waste is handled in an unsound manner.37
Presently, U.S. MNCs export these dangers without incurring any liabil-
ity for harms that result. It is morally repugnant to continue to allow
citizens of developing nations to confront, head-on, the grave dangers
associated with MNCs' ability to externalize the costs of hazardous waste
disposal.3" U.S. MNCs should not be allowed to escape liability for harm
by shipping wastes to developing nations.
This comment will focus on the development of a comprehensive
strategy to force U.S. MNCs to internalize the costs of sound waste dis-
posal and place these expenses where they properly belong - upon the
pollutor. The pollutor may in turn, pass these internalized costs onto the
consumer in the form of higher prices. It is reasonable to expect consum-
ers, as the ultimate purchasers of goods produced by high technical in-
dustry, to pay a price for products that reflects the true expenses involved
in production.39 These expenses include the cost of responsible disposal.
Currently, these costs are passed on to society, and citizens of industrial-
ized as well as developing nations must bear these costs in the form of
increasing cancer rates and birth defects from contaminated water and
soil.4°
This comment will first consider the history and current status of
U.S. regulations governing hazardous waste exports. These regulations
deal primarily with disclosure and attempt to ensure that importing
countries can make informed and knowledgeable decisions about the
individual states. The determination of which products a country imports is well within the sover-
eign prerogative).
37. See Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good Lawyer, and the
American Law School, 36 . LEGAL EDUC. 292, 299 (1980). Many developing nations lack the po-
tential to develop legal systems with the expertise to handle complex lawsuits. America has a strong
remedy system centered around tort law. Thus, providing developing nations with access to
America's strong remedial system provides the crucial ingredients for a decisive institutional shift
toward higher standards of accountability and remedy on the part of developing nations and the
MNCs conducting business with them. Id.
38. For a disuession of these grave dangers see dupra notes 15-25.
39. See Calabresi, supra note 34, at 508.
40. See Epstein, Polluted Data, 18 THE SC. 16 (1979).
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wastes they chose to import.4 ' Some commentators have suggested that
extraterritorial application of U.S. disposal standards is the best response
to deal with the health and environmental hazards presented by illicit
toxic waste disposal.42 The developing nations should not be allowed to
import waste unless they can ensure it will be disposed of according to
the American model of regulation. For a number of reasons to be ana-
lyzed shortly, this is a dubious undertaking.
Although the American model of hazardous waste regulation is not
suitable for export to developing nations, certain aspects of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 43 and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA") or Superfund dealing with the issue of liability are.' These stat-
utes hold generators and transporters of hazardous waste strictly, jointly,
severally and retroactively liable for harm caused by their wastes. 45 They
also contain financial assurance requirements for waste handlers and gen-
erators to assure that they do not use insolvency to avoid payment for
damages.46  The same general principles should apply to hold U.S.
MNCs responsible for harm they cause in developing countries.
The RCRA and CERCLA legislation, however, does not create a
private cause of action for personal injuries that arise out of illicit waste
disposal.47 Thus, along with multinational applicability of the general
41. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)-(f) (Supp. 1984)
(specifies export controls for toxic substances defined as hazardous waste by EPA).
42. See Helfenstein, US. Controls on International Disposal of Hazardous Waste, 22 INT'L. LAW
775, 789 (1988) ("tlhe adequacy of the disposal facility should be no less than the exporting coun-
try's standards, including operations, management, and the appropriate worker protections.").
43. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter RCRA].
44. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Conservation and Liability Act of 1980, as
amended by Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988) [hereinafter CERCLA & SARA respectively].
45. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (Congress in-
tended that responsible parties be held strictly liable, even though an explicit provision for strict
liability was not incorporated into CERCLA); U.S. v. Cauffman, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20161 (Oct. 23, 1984) (Owners and operators of hazardous substance facilities as well as past owners
and operators at the time of disposal are strictly liable under § 9607(a)(1) and (2) respectively).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9608 (1988).
47. See National Sea Clammers Ass'n. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3rd Cir. 1980)
(There is no implied private right to damages for personal injury under federal environmental legis-
lation). A compromise between the House of Representatives and the Senate resulted in the elimina-
tion of a provision allowing an individual victim to sue industry in federal court. Regarding the
compromise, Sen. George Mitchell (D-Maine) stated, "'we are telling the people of this country that
under our value system a property interest is worth compensating, but a human life is not.'" 126
CoNG. Rac. 30941 (1980).
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principles of liability embodied in RCRA and CERCLA, foreign plain-
tiffs should be granted access to U.S. Federal Courts for personal injury
and environmental damage arising from hazardous waste generated by
U.S. MNCs.48 Fundamental principles of international law and basic no-
tions of corporate responsibility justify an expanded role for U.S. Federal
Courts in dealing with toxic torts committed by U.S. MNCs in develop-
ing nations of the world.
II. HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF U.S. LAW
GOVERNING HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTS
Export controls on hazardous waste were initially promulgated and
have undergone substantial revisions in an effort to provide authorities in
the importing countries with enough information to make knowledgea-
ble, fully informed decisions concerning the potential hazards associated
with waste chemicals they are importing. Congress enacted the RCRA
in 1976 to regulate hazardous waste disposal in the United States.49 The
Act established a "cradle to grave" regulatory framework to manage the
generation, handling, and disposal of all hazardous waste. Congress di-
rected the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate regulations identify-
ing and listing hazardous waste as well as registering generators,
50
transporters, 51 and the owners and operators of Treatment Storage and
Disposal facilities.52 The Act contained no provisions to control the ex-
port of wastes. Control of hazardous waste exports was administered by
EPA regulations. Prior to 1980, the provisions were minimal.53 The
EPA required four weeks advance notice before the first yearly shipment
of hazardous waste to a foreign country. 4 The regulations contained no
provision for notification of foreign governments receiving the ship-
ments.55 Further, the EPA lacked the authority to prohibit any export
refused by a foreign country and had no control over the quantity of
waste shipped, manner of transportation or treatment outside the U.S.
56
As a result of the loophole created by the shortcoming of RCRA and
48. The foreign plaintiff may choose among the common law theories of liability available in the
domicile state of the MNC.
49. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 6923.
53. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,732, 12,743-44 (1980).
54. 40 C.F.R. § 262.63 (1989).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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EPA administrative regulations, a number of U.S. companies were able
to avoid the new domestic regulatory requirements by "forum shopping"
among developing countries for waste disposal sites. In response to the
trend toward global forum shopping by U.S. companies, the State De-
partment established a notification and disclosure procedure to bridge
the gap created by RCRA and EPA regulations. Through the notifica-
tion policy, the State Department informed foreign governments to
whom overtures for sale of wastes had been made that the U.S. is con-
cerned about risks associated with the hazardous waste and is willing to
share specific information and provide assistance in gathering informa-
tion in order to evaluate those risks.57
In 1980, the EPA established regulations to manage hazardous
waste exports.58 The exporter was required to notify the EPA thirty days
prior to the first yearly shipment of a regulated hazardous waste. The
agency then notified the foreign government. The exporter also had to
identify the consignee who would be receiving the waste. Finally, the
importer was required to confirm delivery of the shipment.59
Also in 1980, as a result of controversy surrounding hazardous ex-
ports, President Carter signed Executive Order 12,264 entitled "On Fed-
eral Policy Regarding the Export of Banned Substances or Significantly
Restricted Substances." 6 The Executive Order was the culmination of
two and a half years of effort by the "Interagency Working Group on
Hazardous Substances Export Policy." The working group was created
to establish procedures to notify foreign governments of the export of
hazardous products banned or restricted in the United States. The Order
defined "banned or significantly restricted substance" by referring to leg-
islation regulating specific categories of products including foods, drugs,
chemicals, medical devices, and electronics. It was intended to standard-
ize and consolidate the information distributing function of EPA and the
57. See Export of Hazardous Products: Hearings before the Sub-com. on International Economic
Policy and Trade of the Corn. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong.; 2d Sess. 78 (1980). The notification
policy advised:
1. That the U.S. is concerned about the potential health and environmental risks where
adequate hazardous waste programs are lacking.
2. That we stand willing to share specific information on those risks and make that
information public.
3. That it would be in the importing government's own interest to obtain full informa-
tion from potential exporters, particularly on the nature, volume and toxicity of the
wastes and evaluate the risks involved before concluding any agreement.
58. 40 C.F.R. § 262.50 (1989).
59. Id.
60. Exec. Order No. 12,264, 46 Fed. Reg. 4659 (1981) [hereinafter Carter Order].
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State Department through a notification procedure that would allow the
foreign government to determine whether local conditions require the
products use despite potential dangers.61 In essence, the Order placed
the endorsement of the Executive behind the State Department's ad hoc
notice and disclosure policy. The Order also established procedures for
the President to ban the export of extremely hazardous substances pursu-
ant to Executive authority under the Export Administration Act.62 The
President could impose export controls for hazardous substances:
(a) which represent a substantial threat to human health or safety or to the
environment,
(b) the export of which would cause clear and significant harm to the for-
eign policy interests of the United States, and
(c) for which export licenses would be granted only in exceptional cases.63
The portion of the Order was designed to curb the most egregious cases
of U.S. MNCs distributing to foreign nations products banned in the
U.S.
President Reagan, within one month of his inauguration, rescinded
the Carter Order by signing Executive Order 12,290 entitled "Federal
Exports and Excessive Regulation."'6 The Reagan Order was rational-
ized as an attempt to implement the dual goals of enhancing the competi-
tiveness of U.S. exports and eliminating over-regulation of business by
government.65
Congress substantially improved regulations for the management of
hazardous waste exports through the enactment of the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 ("HSWA"). 6 6 The Act gives the EPA
authority to control hazardous waste exports and coordinate notice and
disclosure requirements. The provisions went into effect in November of
1986 and prohibit hazardous waste exports until the U.S. government
has been notified that the importing country has agreed to accept the
waste.67
The "prior consent requirement" 68 of HSWA demonstrates aware-
61. See id.
62. See D. Kramer, Dumping Report 17-19 (April 27, 1982) (available with The Lawyers Com-
mittee for International Human Rights).
63. Id. at 19.
64. See Childress, Executive Authority: Revocation of Executive Order Requiring Notification of
Export of Hazardous Substances, 22 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 683 (1981).
65. Id. at 686.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 111984).
67. Id.
68. The notification, which is to be made to the EPA Administrator, must contain the
following:
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ness on the part of Congress that the environment is a vital foreign policy
issue. Continued export of hazardous waste without the consent of the
importing nation was becoming a source of extreme tension and embar-
rassment for the United States and the developing nations who felt vic-
timized by MNC's illicit waste dumping-an act often viewed as a
blatant example of the legacy of imperialism.
The EPA regulations published under authority of HSWA require
the exporter to provide sixty days notice of a waste shipment bound for a
foreign country.6 9 One notice, however, is valid for two years of planned
exports, but any alteration of the plan including composition of the ship-
ment or quantity, necessitates renotification and re-affirmation of consent
by the importing country.70
The EPA regulations also create a recording system similar to do-
mestic provisions governing transport of hazardous waste.71 The notifi-
cation procedure requires the exporter to list the types and quantity of
waste to be exported, the estimated frequency of exports as well as man-
ner of transportation, port of entry and proposed treatment, storage and
disposal in the importing country.
Consent of the receiving country is an absolute prerequisite and is
coordinated by the EPA through the State Department. The EPA
prepares a file for the importing country that includes information sub-
(1) the names and address of the exporter;
(2) the types and estimated quantities of the hazardous waste to be exported;
(3) the estimated frequency or rate at which such waste is to be exported and the period
of time over which such waste is to be exported;
(4) the ports of entry;
(5) a description of the manner in which such hazardous waste will be transported to
and treated, stored, or disposed in the receiving country; and
(6) the name and address of the ultimate treatment storage or disposal facility.
42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (1988).
Once the EPA has been notified of the proposed shipment, the Secretary of State, acting on behalf
of the Administrator, shall:
(1) forward a copy of the notification to the government of the receiving country;
(2) advise the government that United States law prohibits the export of hazardous
waste unless the receiving country consents to accept the hazardous waste;
(3) request the government to provide the Secretary with a written consent or objection
to the terms of the notification; and
(4) forward to the government of the receiving country a description of the Federal
regulations which would apply to the treatment, storage, and disposal of the hazard-
ous waste in the United States.
Id. § 6938(d). The EPA must forward the foreign government's response to the shipping party
within 30 days of receipt by the Secretary of State. Id. § 6938(e).
69. 40 C.F.R. § 262.52(a) (1989).
70. Id. § 262.53(c) (1989).
71. Jd. § 262 (1989).
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mitted by the exporter as well as regulations governing the treatment,
storage, and disposal of the particular hazardous waste in the U.S. The
American exporter must wait for a confirmation from the importing
country before the waste is shipped.
HSWA provides criminal penalties for knowing violation of export
regulations.72 "Primary exporters ' 73 who initiate hazardous waste export
jointly bear the most responsibility and liability. They are responsible for
timely, complete and accurate notification to EPA regarding proposed
export and for compliance with the prior consent requirement of the im-
porting country.74 Transporters are responsible for ensuring that EPA
records accompany the shipment including the importer's written
consent.75
The HSWA export requirements are significant because they ensure
that no hazardous waste will be shipped without the prior informed con-
sent of the importing nation. The regulations require the importing na-
tion to receive pertinent information about the waste in order to make an
informed decision whether the potential benefits of importing the waste
(economic or otherwise) are outweighed by the dangers to human health
and the environment presented by exposure to the wastes. The notice
and disclosure provisions of HSWA, however, are severely limited by the
restrictive definition given to hazardous waste by the EPA. Many types
of hazardous wastes and chemical compounds are not covered by the
EPA's definition of hazardous waste and are thus excluded from the ex-
port provisions of HSWA.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SAFETY REGULATIONS
A. The Low Road
Within the regulatory model there are two possible approaches for
managing hazardous waste exports. They can be characterized as the
"low road" approach and the "high road" approach. 76 Both strategies,
however, are impotent in dealing with overt and insidious dangers
72. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
73. 40 C.F.R. § 262.51 (1989).
74. 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.53(a) & 262.54 (1989).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 262.51.
76. See McGarity, Bhopal and the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEx. INT'L. L.J. 333,
335-36 (1985). In proposing solutions to deal with the export of hazardous technology, the author
characterizes the "'low road'" approach as requiring "the United States [to] warn the recipient
country of the dangers of the technology, and let that country decide what, if anything, to do about
it." Id. at 334. On the other hand, "the 'high road' approach would subject all operations of multi-
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presented to the human environment by hazardous wastes. The fact that
both approaches are subject to similar criticism points out the pressing
need to move beyond regulation as a strategy to control attempts by U.S.
MNCs to avoid liability for harms caused by their wastes.
Current U.S. export regulations under HSWA approximate the "low
road" approach to managing hazardous waste exports." The U.S. gov-
ernment, through the EPA and the State Department warn developing
nations of the dangers accompanying waste they are importing. Through
disclosure and access to scientific data, the importing country can weigh
the risks and benefits and make an informed decision whether or not to
import the waste. By emphasizing full disclosure and access to informa-
tion, the "low road" allows developing nations to make autonomous de-
cisions unburdened by paternalistic legislation of the exporting nation.
Through multilateral agreements, many LDCs have condemned the
practice of hazardous waste disposal in their territory. 78 These agree-
ments have resulted in a proliferation of legislation banning waste dispo-
sal in developing nations.79 Clearly, these nations have a sovereign right
to ban waste imports or allow them at their discretion. Thus, the princi-
ple advantage of the "low road" is its respect for developing nation's
sovereignty. The importing nation is properly allowed to make the
choice.
The "low road" approach, however, is a severely flawed strategy for
managing the problem of illicit waste disposal. As noted previously, the
EPA's definition of hazardous waste under HSWA is a particularly nar-
row one.80 Developing nations therefore, are making informed choices
about a fairly limited number of hazardous wastes they may be import-
ing. Further, the United States is still open to the criticism of maintain-
national corporations (MNCs) in other countries, to the same standards that apply in the United
States." Id. at 335.
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 6938. See also supra note 66 for notice and disclosure requirements.
78. See Reuters Wire Service (Press Release) (July 30, 1988) (At a conference hosted by Brazil,
the South Atlantic Nations called for an end to transferring hazardous waste to the region). See also
Shabecoff, Irate and Afraid, Poor Nations Fight Efforts to Use Them as Toxic Dumps, N.Y. Times,
July 5, 1988, at 4, col. 4 ("[t]he Organization of African Unity, a coalition of African nations, passed
a resolution condemning the export of waste chemicals, metals and radioactive materials to their
continent as 'a crime against Africa and African people.' The resolution called on all African na-
tions to end such transactions.").
79. See, Government Pledge to Prevent Dumping of Toxic Waste, Wall St. J., June 27, 1988, at 1,
col. 1 (pledge by leaders of the Economic Community of West African States to bring into force laws
criminalizing aiding and abetting in dumping); Brooke, Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (Nigeria has prescribed "the death penalty for any Nigerian,
any foreigner, caught in the act of bringing in toxic waste.").
80. See, eg., supra notes 76-77.
[Vol. 39
HAZARDOUS WASTE
ing a "doublestandard"' by allowing products and chemicals that have
been banned for domestic consumption due to deleterious health and en-
vironmental effects to be exported and dumped on markets in developing
countries.
It is also easy to question the extent to which LDCs are truly in-
formed of particular risks. Lack of industrialization is usually accompa-
nied by a lack of a regulatory frame-work to protect human health and
the environment.8 2 Most LDCs do not have the scientific capacity to
properly analyze data on hazardous waste let alone the sophisticated in-
frastructure necessary to dispose of it in a responsible way. Moreover,
the "low road" requires only that governments be informed and does not
inquire whether the people who are affected are informed.83 If the im-
porting government does not share information with its citizens regard-
ing the danger, the promise of "informed consent" is a false one. Tragic
consequences often flow from ignoring the cultural differences and edu-
cational disparities between industrialized and developing nations.
8 4
The "low road" approach is also susceptible to charges of "eco-
nomic imperialism" leveled by developing nations at the industrialized
world.8 5 U.S. MNCs and LDCs do not approach the bargaining table as
equals. LDCs are faced with a competitive disadvantage. MNCs are
aware of this fact and exploit it to their full advantage. LDCs are under
economic duress to accept contractual terms dictated by MNCs, while
MNCs are in a position to forum shop among debt burdened developing
nations for the most favorable terms of disposal contracts. The corporate
managers are in full control of this coercive situation. LDCs are at a
competitive disadvantage and must accept the exporters' terms or noth-
81. See Note, Any Place But Here" A Critique of United States Hazardous Export Policy, 7
BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 329, 330 (1981). The "double standard" means essentially, that on the one
hand, the U.S. will protect its citizens from hazardous products, on the other hand it will allow
MNCs to ship these products abroad to the unwary. Thus, the principle of caveat emptor is alive and
well in international markets. Id.
82. See Bordewich, supra note 14, at 33; Maragarinos de Mello, supra note 14, at 53.
83. See Shue, supra note 13, at 590.
84. See Greenwood, Restrictions on the Exportation of Hazardous Products to the Third World:
Regulator Imperialism or Ethical Responsibility, 5 B.C. THIRD WRLD. L. REv. 129, 133 (1985).
This aritcle points out that disregard for the unique circumstances faced by developing nations, such
as Bolivia, by pesticide salesmen has led to resistant moths that destroy crops. As a result of this
tradegy, some of the farmers committed suicide by drinking the pesticide. The farmers believed that
they were "the killers of Pachama-Mother Earth." Id.
85. See Shue, supra note 13, at 601. The government of a developing nation that needs foreign
investment has little or no bargaining power. "A government that requires foreign investors to use
more expensive, safer processes puts itself at a competitive disadvantage against other poor countries
that are trying to attract the same firms." Id.
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ing at all."6 Freedom of choice and autonomous decision making, which
are held out as the principle advantage of the "low road" requires more
than adequate information. It requires two parties to approach an agree-
ment from positions of relative equality,87 and under no compulsion.
The current situation is more accurately characterized as a coercive one
which corporations put to profitable use. The "low road" allows devel-
oping nations to continue establishing themselves as havens of pollution.
Even the most cynical analysis of the "low road" points out a signifi-
cant danger in this strategy. Consumers in industrial nations have begun
to suffer the consequences of permitting the unregulated export of haz-
ardous waste through a phenomenon known as reimportation of
wastes. 88 This phenomenon can occur, for example, when industrial
sludge contaminated with toxic heavy metals is marketed and sold as
"fertilizer" to grow produce that developing nations export for sale in the
U.S.; or when banned or severely restricted pesticides are sold to devel-
oping nations to grow produce that ends up in our local grocery stores,
thus completing the circle of poison. "Out of sight, out of mind" is an
apt description of how we view hazardous waste disposal in developing
nations. This policy of treating the world as our backyard and develop-
ing nations as our garbage bin can have dramatic, and tragic
repercussions.89
B. The High Road
U.S. hazardous waste export regulations under HSWA stop at the
shores of the importing nation, and do not address the issue of how waste
is handled by the receiving country. Recently, some commentators have
addressed the issue of receiving facility standards and have argued in
favor of the "high road" approach. 9' Under this regulatory strategy,
EPA would unilaterally impose the U.S. model of regulation upon devel-
86. Id. at 601.
87. J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). When "all are similarly situated and no one is
able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a
fair agreement or bargain." Id.
88. See Porterfield & Weir, supra note 7, at 344. Here, Wendy Grieder, an official of the EPA's
Office of International Activities aptly stated:
It's possible that we could send sludge to the Caribbean and they might use it on, say,
spinach or other vegetables. We would get it back here and the FDA would say, " 'Hey,
wait, you've got too much cadmium in those vegetables.'" Since the FDA checks only a
small portion of foods and vegetables that come into the United States, exported hazard-
ous wastes could easily end up on our dinner table.
89. See id
90. See Helfenstein, supra note 42, at 789.
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oping nations. U.S. MNCs operating in developing nations would be
subject to the same standards of conduct that apply domestically. Before
importing hazardous waste, LDCs would be forced to adopt the same
regulations managing transportation, storage, and disposal of waste that
U.S. MNCs domestic operations must comply with.
The primary benefit of the "high road" is to bring the environment
and citizens of developing nations under the umbrella of protection pro-
vided by U.S. environmental and safety legislation.91 Thus, the human
environment of LDCs is protected to the same extent as the environment
in advanced industrialized society. Proponents of the "high road" ap-
proach argue that their strategy is necessary to deal with the imminent
health and environmental hazards presented by irresponsible waste dis-
posal. Another justification for this approach is that the importing coun-
try can neither make nor implement a reasoned decision as to what level
of risk they will accept. The argument is made even more compelling by
the inability of developing countries to create an infrastructure to deal
with hazardous wastes in the face of graft, corruption, volatile govern-
ments and economic pressure to accept the immediate financial benefits
of hard currency in return for providing a market for hazardous waste.92
Like the "low road" approach, the "high road" is a severely flawed
strategy for managing harms that result from illicit waste disposal. For
all its potential virtue, the "high road" is almost completely paternalistic
and fails to deal with the developing nations' sovereign right to decide
what risks are acceptable. 93 The "high road" assumes that no developing
nation is capable of regulating hazardous waste. This paternalistic posi-
tion ignores cultural, geographic, and economic factors that may make
the American regulatory model completely inappropriate for developing
countries.94 The "high road" provides no guidance for determining when
variance from American domestic regulatory standards would be appro-
91. Our environmental protection legislation is far from perfect, but it is probably better at
protecting human health and the environment than any legislation in developing nations.
92. See Hazardous Waste Waste Export Bill Introduced To Require Importing Country To Meet
U.S. Standards, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) (Oct. 3, 1988) (Rep. Porter (R-IL) introduced
legislation that would require importing countries to conform with U.S. standards. This legislation
is prompted by inadequate U.S. export law and LDC environmental law).
93. See Greenwood, supra note 84, at 129-30, 133. Respect for sovereignty of nations is essen-
tial. Products banned in developing countries may produce benefits in developing nations that out-
weigh risks. For example, "developing countries plagued with malaria and other tropical diseases
may perceive a need to use banned pesticides." The LDC may be faced with choosing the lesser of
two evils-malaria or DDT. The LDC is in the best position to consider the appropriate factors and
make a decision. Id. at 130.
94. See id. at 133.
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priate for a different system of government with a different culture faced
with a unique set of problems. These problems include but are not lim-
ited to balancing the necessity of strengthening industry in order to abate
poverty, with the need to develop standards to maintain the integrity of
the human environment. In fact, unilateral imposition of the American
model has led to charges of "regulatory imperialism." 95 Export of the
American regulatory model has been viewed as repression, thinly veiled
by altruistic motivation. LDCs often see environmental regulation as a
wolf in sheep's clothing designed to perpetuate the existing cycle of im-
poverishment. Although the situation is rare at present, it is not difficult
to envision a reasonably competent developing nation with a reasonably
representative government making an informed and well reasoned deci-
sion to accept risks associated with importing hazardous wastes that are
greater than risks generators are permitted to impose domestically. De-
veloping nations have a sovereign right to create standards independent
of U.S. regulation for differentiating acceptable from unacceptable
risks.96
The disclosure and notice requirements of HSWA97 are useful for
managing waste exports to the extent they facilitate disclosure, informa-
tion gathering and reasoned analysis of the risks and benefits associated
with importation of wastes on the part of developing countries. The two
strategies within the regulatory model, however, are inadequate to deal
with the complex problems and circumstances that attend hazardous
waste exports to developing nations. The regulatory model of managing
hazardous exports is flawed because by concentrating solely on disclosure
it fails to address the crux of the issue-imposing liability upon U.S. cor-
porations for harms created by waste they generate, final destination of
those wastes notwithstanding. Although U.S. waste generators can avoid
the strictures of domestic hazardous waste regulation by exporting to de-
veloping nations, they should not also be permitted to wash their hands
of liability for environmental degradation and human disease that results
from irresponsible waste disposal. Thus, liability is a more productive
strategy than regulation to force corporations to internalize costs of re-
sponsible waste disposal that are currently passed off onto developing
nations.
95. See Bordewich, supra note 14, at 30 (Environmentalism is sometimes viewed as a Western
plot to retard the growth of developing countries).
96. See id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 6938.
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IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR HARM
A. Generator and Transporter Liability
Imposing liability upon MNCs for harm caused by waste exported
to developing nations avoids the problem of making analytical distinc-
tions required under the "high road" approach. Under this regulatory
model, it is necessary to separate developing nations that are not capable
of making or implementing a reasoned decision as to what level of risk
they will accept from developing nations with reasonably competent gov-
ernments and the infrastructure necessary to engage in a reasoned analy-
sis of risks and benefits attending importation of hazardous waste. A
strategy centered on liability rather than regulation makes the generator
the guarantor for both types of inquiry. Thus, the MNC that wishes to
export waste must determine if a particular developing nation is capable
of handling hazardous wastes responsibly so as not to incur liability. The
generator is liable for damages resulting from a mistaken assessment.
B. RCR4 and CERCLA
Through the RCRA98 and CERCLA 9" Congress has recognized its
domestic obligation to protect the integrity of the human environment by
mandating generator and transporter liability for damage caused by haz-
ardous waste. Congress must also recognize its international obligation
to ensure that U.S. MNCs who generate and transport waste are held
accountable for harms caused by wastes exported to developing nations.
Although the American regulatory framework as codified in specific
provisions of RCRA and CERCLA regulating domestic requirements
for transport, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes is not suitable as
a regulatory model for developing nations, general provisions of these
statutes mandating generator and transporter liability are. CERCLA
makes generators of hazardous waste strictly, jointly, severally and ret-
roactively liable for harm caused by their wastes. 1" CERCLA also cre-
ates financial assurance requirements for waste handlers and generators
to assure that they do not use insolvency to avoid payment for dam-
ages.101 By analogy, these provisions should apply multinationally to
create liability for U.S. MNCs exporting hazardous waste to developing
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The courts have interpreted this section to create strict liability. See
e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 9608.
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nations where they are disposed of in an irresponsible manner. Cur-
rently, U.S. MNCs are able to do an end-run around domestic regulation
by shipping hazardous waste to developing countries. They should not,
however, be able to escape liability when the end result of this scheme is
injury, death and environmental degradation.
RCRA was enacted in 1976 in order to abolish unregulated land
disposal of discarded material and hazardous wastes. Under original
provisions of the Act, the Administrator of EPA was empowered to seek
equitable relief against any person contributing "to the handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste
that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to public
health or the environment."'' 2 Although Congress did not create a pri-
vate cause of action for hazardous waste injuries, the RCRA vests citi-
zens with a right to equitable relief by allowing enforcement of any
standard, regulation or order promulgated by the EPA under the author-
ity of RCRA. 03 With passage of HSWA in 1984, Congress extended the
use of EPA's equitable powers to impose liability upon waste generators
who do not dispose of wastes at the location of production."° Impor-
tantly, the equitable powers granted by section 6973 apply regardless of
fault or negligence. 105 To facilitate abatement of health and environmen-
tal threats, RCRA also imposes retroactive liability upon waste genera-
tors no longer dumping waste at a particular site. 106
Congress enacted CERCLA (Superfund) in 1980 to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites by placing the ultimate financial burden upon those
responsible for the danger. 0 7 The Act creates a revolving fund which
can be tapped by the EPA, state, and local governments to clean up
102. 42 U.S.C. § 6973.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 7002 (1988).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (a). HSWA explicitly modified and extended the equitable powers of
EPA to create equitable relief against off-site generators as follows:
The administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate dis-
trict court against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treat-
ment, transportation, or disposal, to order such person to take such other action as may
be necessary, or both.
Id.
105. See Comment, The Imposition of Vicarious Strict Liability on Off-Site Generators of Haz-
ardous Waste, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 569, 575 n.33 (1988).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a); see also supra note 103.
107. See Eddy & Riendl, Transporter Liability Under CERCLA, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10244 (Sept. 1986) (This legislation has the potential to impose more onerous and overpower-
ing liability than any environmental statute before it).
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waste dumps that are placed on the EPA's national priority list."'8 Sec-
tion 9607(a) has been interpreted to hold generators and transporters of
hazardous waste, as well as past and present owners of disposal facilities
strictly, jointly, and severally liable for the costs of clean up of wastes. 09
The above mentioned actors are referred to as "potentially responsible
parties" ("PRPs") for section 9607(a) "response costs." 10 PRPs can be
ordered to perform clean ups under section 9606 enforcement actions,
can be sued for section 9607(a) response costs after federal or state gov-
ernment has performed a clean up, or can enter voluntary settlements
with government concerning their liability for clean up."' Although
CERCLA does not create a private cause of action for injuries arising
from hazardous waste, it does make off-site generators liable for both
public and private response costs. Thus, section 9607(a) authorizes a pri-
vate cause of action limited to recovery of incurred response costs. 2
Based on legislative history and judicial interpretation, it is a settled
question that CERCLA imposes strict liability at least for response
108. See (SARA) Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 16 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10363 (Dec. 1986).
109. See Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1042.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). "Liability" is defined here defined as:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses
set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport or disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party
or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, inceration vessels or sites selected by such per-
son, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the in-
currence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consis-
tent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Ill. Id. § 9607(b).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
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Costs. 113
The courts have also determined that CERCLA creates a relaxed
causation requirement. With respect to generator liability, the majority
of cases have determined that causation is not an element of liability
under CERCLA,1 14 although a clear minority hold that some form of
causation is necessary.11 The majority position is based on a literal
reading of section 9607(a)(3). The plaintiff need only establish that:
1. The generators hazardous substances were shipped to the facility
in issue;
2. The generators hazardous substances, or substances like those of
the generator, are present at the facility;
3. There is a release or threat of release of any hazardous substance
at the facility; and
4. Response costs were incurred as a result of the threat of
release. 1
16
Since there may be cases where it is impossible to differentiate among
generators who dumped waste at a particular site, courts have construed
section 9607(a) as implicitly authorizing the imposition of joint and sev-
eral liability where the harm is indivisible and liability cannot be appor-
tioned, even though Congress omitted "joint and several liability"
language from the statute.11
Although neither CERCLA nor RCRA authorize a private action
for personal injury, both statutes demonstrate the continued develop-
ment and expanding scope of liability for harm caused by hazardous
wastes. Congress has recognized the virtue of holding waste generators
liable for domestic health and environmental problems created by their
wastes. U.S. MNCs should not be allowed to avoid their responsibility
for harm simply by shipping waste to developing nations. Through
global forum shopping MNCs pick and choose between LDCs that offer
lax health and environmental standards. They actively seek developing
nations that offer the least possible recourse for harm from hazardous
113. See Eddy & RiendI, supra note 107, at 10246; see also Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1035.
114. See Eddy & Riendl, supra note 107, at 10247 (Provisions that would have required the
usual common law nexus or causation were deleted from CERCLA prior to its enactment). See also
U.S. v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
115. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court ap-
peared to interpret CERCLA as requiring a causal link between a particular defendant's waste and
the incurrence of response costs by the plaintiff.
116. See Eddy & Riendl, supra note 107, at 10247.
117. See U.S. v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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waste. By not imposing liability 18 to deal with this deplorable state of
affairs, Congress implicitly approves and rubberstamps this kind of activ-
ity." 9 As the ultimate purchasers of products with artificially low prices
made possible by externalities causing health and environmental degra-
dation in LDCs, we are guilty of complicity in this venture. Therefore,
Congress should authorize a cause of action for environmental and per-
sonal injury in federal court for foreign plaintiffs injured by exported
waste generated by U.S. MNCs. Congress, however, has previously re-
fused to grant American citizens a federal private cause of action for
harm from hazardous waste; it is unrealistic to believe that legislation
granting a private right of action to citizens of LDCs will be enacted in
the near future.
Despite the improbability of a statutory private cause of action in
U.S. courts for these potential plaintiffs, the legislative standards of liabil-
ity authorized by RCRA and CERCLA are part of the foundation for
the basic premise that U.S. MNCs should be made responsible for harms
caused by their waste, no matter where those harms occur.
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ENDORSEMENT FOR STATE AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
There are a number of related international agreements and prece-
dents in customary international law that provide guidance for allocating
responsibility for damage inflicted upon the environment. These agree-
ments are based on the principle of "volunteerism" and lack a uniform
structure for enforcement of obligations. Thus, U.S. MNCs reign as sov-
ereigns in international markets, with freedom to export hazardous waste
without fear of liability at home or from the international community.
They roam the globe with impunity, achieving short term profit max-
imization and avoiding liability by conducting business in developing na-
tions lacking health, safety, and environmental standards.
International law supports the allocation of responsibility for harm
118. See Bruno, The Development of a Strict Liability Cause of Action for Personal Injuries Re-
sulting from Hazardous Waste, 16 NEW ENG. L. REv. 543, 562 (1981):
Although having failed, the attempt to include a strict liability and victims compensation
clause in a Superfund Bill, demonstrated awareness on the part of the legislators of the
necessity to protect the individual's right to compensation for personal injuries and that
a victim's compensation clause would be an incentive for industry to be more careful in
the disposal of waste.
119. See id. at 562.
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on those who cause the damage.120  The fundamental concept upon
which the developing international law of the environment is based is sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas121 or "the principle of good neighborli-
ness." This concept is manifest in international agreements that articu-
late a simple, straightforward thesis-every nation ought generally to
avoid producing harm outside its territory. This guiding principle finds
expression in a number of international agreements of which the U.S. is a
part.
As a result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment at Stockholm in 1972, the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram ("UNEP") was established to deal with worldwide environmental
problems. This conference was the first manifestation of worldwide envi-
ronmental concern, and ended with the announcement of the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment. 22 Principle 21 provides that
States have, in accordance with the 'Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction or control. 123
Principle 21 recognizes that along with a sovereign right to exploit their
own resources, nations have a corresponding duty or responsibility not to
inflict avoidable harm upon the environment of other States. Principle
22 of the Declaration encourages international organizations to develop
standards of liability and compensation to deal with situations where a
nation fails to comply with its responsibility not to inflict harm.124
Based on Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, the Organiza-
120. See Magraw, Transboundry Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of "Interna.
tional Liability," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305, 308-9 (1986):
The topic implicates two potentially conflicting principles of international law: on the
one hand, the sovereign right of a state to be free to engage in activities within its own
territory and to regulate its own nationals; and on the other hand, the duty of a state to
exercise its rights in a manner that does not unreasonably harm the interests of other
states, including, significantly, the duty to regulate activities within its own territory.
121. The "principle of good neighborliness" lends support to the concept of State responsibility
for the environment. See Goldie, Special Regimes and Pre-emptive Activities in International Law, 11
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 670, 687-91 (1962).
122. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 11 I.L.M.
1416 (1972) (U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14).
123. See id. at 1420.
124. "Principle 22: states shall co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by activ-
ities within the jurisdiction or control of such states to areas beyond their jurisdiction." See id.
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tion for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") 125 formu-
lated an approach to transboundry pollution based on the principle of
nondiscrimination. 126 This principle recognizes that liability for a pollut-
ing activity must follow pollution. It also holds polluters liable for trans-
frontier pollution under standards no less severe than their home
country. 127 This standard implicitly recognizes the serious risks and ineq-
uities involved when MNCs forum shop among developing nations to
avoid liability. The result is an intolerable situation where the populace
of LDCs are victimized by MNCs creating environmental disasters with
impunity, in order to externalize costs and maximize short term profits.
The OECD decision places MNCs on notice that they will be held re-
sponsible for harms according to the environmental and health standards
of their home country, regardless of where they export those harms.
In 1986, an OECD Export Decision was enacted mandating general
procedures to guide members in making export decisions. The export
decision is based on the principle of nondiscrimination and validates the
emerging sense of international responsibility for personal injury and en-
vironmental degradation caused by hazardous exports. It requires that
member countries:
1. Ensure that their authorities are empowered to prohibit hazardous
waste exports in appropriate instances;
2. Apply equally strict controls on non-member countries as are imposed
on member countries;
3. Prohibit the movement of hazardous waste to a nonmember country
without the consent of that country; and
4. Prohibit movement of hazardous waste to nonmember countries unless
the wastes are directed to adequate disposal facilities.
128
The final requirement of the OECD directive forbids member na-
tions to allow hazardous waste exports to other countries unless the
waste can be handled in a sound manner. Like the principle of nondis-
crimination, this provision of the OECD directive is an attempt to con-
125. OECD began as a group of countries operating under the Marshall Plan reconstruction of
Europe after W.W. II. Members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See Helfenstein, supra note 42, at 781 n.54.
126. The principle holds: "(a) polluters causing transfrontier pollution should be subject to legal
or statutory provisions no less severe than those which would apply for any equivalent pollution
occurring within their country... See 14 I.L.M. 242, 245 (1975).
127. See id. at 245.
128. See OECD Council Decision - Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes from
the OECD Area, 25 I.L.M. 1010, 1011 (1986).
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trol MNCs ability to expand dangerous industrial activities abroad in the
face of increasingly strict health and environmental regulation imposed
at home.
The current status of U.S. controls on hazardous waste exports fall
far short of compliance with the OECD mandate. Wholesale exportation
of the American regulatory model, however, is not an attractive solution
to the problem. The pitfalls of this approach have been well demon-
strated. Perhaps the best solution is to make MNCs that sell hazardous
waste to developing nations responsible for determining whether a partic-
ular LDC has the capacity to handle wastes responsibly. By making
MNCs the guarantor for this inquiry, and establishing liability for dam-
ages resulting from illicit waste disposal, MNCs will take greater care
deciding which LDCs to sell hazardous waste to. They will be seriously
concerned about how the waste is managed after it is sold, since the po-
tential liabilities for reckless handling of hazardous waste are
tremendous. 129
Through provisions of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment and the OECD Export Decision, the international commu-
nity has recognized the practicality and basic fairness behind policies that
require the polluter to pay for human and environmental tragedies cre-
ated by waste they create. These declarations arise out of fundamental
ethical principles that provide an excellent foundation and justification
for expanding the scope of liability to encompass U.S. MNCs who cur-
rently operate with impunity and dictate the terms of the hazardous
waste trade.
The first international agreement regulating the hazardous waste
trade, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal,13 was established on
March 22, 1989, at the conclusion of a conference sponsored by the
United Nations in Basel, Switzerland. Along with establishing a U.N.-
administered agency to regulate and monitor international shipments of
129. See Foreign Firms Feel the Impact of Bhopal Most, Wall St. J., Nov. 26, 1985, at 24, col. 4.
Harold Corbett, senior vice president for environmental affairs at Monsanto Co. was quoted as
saying:
Bhopal's greatest impact, it seems has been on the multinationals. The realization of
corporate headquarters that liability for any Bhopal-like disaster would be decided in
U.S. courts more than pressure from Third World governments has forced companies to
tighten procedures, upgrade plants, supervise maintenance more closely and educate
workers and communities.
130. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 657 (1989) (UNEP 1G. 80/3).
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hazardous waste, the Basel Convention also includes provisions that re-
quire the approval of both the importing and exporting nations before
hazardous waste can be shipped. Specifically, Article 6 of the Basel Con-
vention, entitled "Transboundary Movement Between Parties" provides:
3. The State of export shall not allow the generator or exporter to
commence the transboundary movement [of waste] until it has received
written confirmation that:
(a) The notifier has received the written consent of the State of im-
port; and
(b) The notifier has received from the State of import confirmation
of the existence of a contract between the exporter and the disposer speci-
fying environmentally sound management of the waste in question.
131
While the Basel Convention is an important first step toward inter-
national cooperation in controlling hazardous waste exports, it does little
more than place the international stamp of approval upon inadequate
U.S. regulations currently governing waste export under the HSWA.
132
The notice and consent provision of the Basel Convention are reminis-
cent of notice and consent regulations under current U.S. regulations re-
quiring written consent from the importing country. 13  Thus, the Basel
Convention adds nothing new to the existing rules, and there is little
reason to expect the Convention to impact seriously upon the burgeoning
international hazardous waste trade.1
3 4
VI. COMMON LAW LIABILITY AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
In the absence of comprehensive international controls on hazard-
ous waste exports and federal legislation creating a private cause of ac-
tion for damages from hazardous waste, U.S. MNCs are presented with a
convenient opportunity to externalize costs. Although International
agreements, and U.S. statutes and regulations are inadequate to deal with
this complex problem, they provide a foundation to justify the imposition
of liability upon corporate actors engaged in the illicit export of hazard-
ous wastes to developing nations. Given the inability of International
131. Id. at 49.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 76-89. This similarity means that the notice and con-
sent provisions of the Basel Convention are equally susceptible to the many criticisms of the "low
road" approach.
134. During the meeting of the Convention many representatives of developing nations insisted
that waste generators and exporters assure responsibility for their hazardous wastes. This proposal
was rejected by the industrialized nations. See, Johnson, Keeping Tabs on the Worlds Waste, CHEMI-
CAL ENGINEERING, Apr. 1989, at 48E; see also, Greenhouse, U.N. Conference Supports Curbs on
Exporting of Hazardous Waste, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1989, at Al, col.1.
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Law and Congress to close this loophole, U.S. courts are uniquely situ-
ated to compel American MNCs to reckon with harms caused by irre-
sponsible exportation of hazardous waste to developing nations. Foreign
plaintiffs, particularly those from LDCs should be allowed access to U.S.
courts for the redress of grievances caused by hazardous wastes gener-
ated in the U.S. The judiciary should place U.S. MNCs on notice that if
they plan to export hazardous waste to developing nations that lack the
ability to handle them responsibly, the judiciary is prepared to provide
citizens of LDCs U.S. courts for the health and environmental damage
that will inevitably result.1
35
Since there is no way that personal injury victims, whether foreign
or U.S. citizens can obtain relief for private injuries under current federal
environmental statutes, they must rely on theories of common law liabil-
ity as developed by the states. In order to secure access to federal court
and American common law, the foreign plaintiff must first defeat the
corporate defendant's motion for dismissal under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens. 136 Although this may not be the most imposing hurdle
the foreign plaintiff will face, it is the first, and symbolically the most
important. It represents continued judicial acquiescence in corporate
policy that externalizes the costs of responsible waste disposal. The
American judiciary and legal system are uniquely capable of accomplish-
ing a reversal of this policy.
The foreign plaintiff in these actions will be able to establish that
federal courts have competence to hear their case. This can be done
through diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Section 1332 of Title 28 of
the United States Code grants original jurisdiction to district courts
where the matter in controversy is greater than $50,000 and is between
citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state. 137 A U.S.
based MNC is subject to personal jurisdiction of federal courts in any
state where the corporation has minimal contacts.138
Among the defendant's first strategy to block a personal injury suit
brought by a foreign plaintiff will be a motion to dismiss on the basis of
135. See McGarity supra note 76, at 339 (suggesting that the most effective thing the U.S. can
do to prevent future Bhopals is open up the doors of the courts to victims of hazardous waste
generated by U.S. MNCs in developing nations).
136. See Birnbaum & Wrobel, Foreign Plaintiffs and the American Manufacturer Is a Court in
the U.S. a Forum Non Conveniens?, 20 THE FORUM 59, 60 (1984). (Forum non conveniens is an
equitable doctrine that permits a court, in its discretion, to decline to exercise jurisdiction for pru-
dential reasons).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
138. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 136, at 62.
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forum non conveniens. Although jurisdiction has been established, the
doctrine permits federal courts to dismiss a plaintiff's suit if the choice of
forum is unreasonably inconvenient for defendant or would administra-
tively encumber the court. 139 The decision is based on an cpen-ended
balancing by the trial judge of considerations including convenience of
litigants and witnesses and the availability of evidence in plaintiff's cho-
sen forum. The decision is committed to the discretion of the trial judge.
The ultimate resolution of the motion is often based as much on the per-
sonal predilection of the judge as upon a balancing of uniform
standards.) 4°
The guidelines for determining the outcome of a forum non con-
veniens motion were articulated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert.41 The Court announced a test that involved balancing of
"private interest" of the litigant against factors of "public interest" and
added that the doctrine must be applied flexibly with no single determi-
native factor. Initially, the trial court is required to determine whether
an adequate alternative forum exists that would have jurisdiction over
the parties and subject matter. Once defendant has established that there
is an alternative forum where it can be sued, the trial court can proceed
to balance the interests.142 The private interests of the litigant include:
... the relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appro-
priate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial, of a
case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.... The court will weigh relative
advantages and obstacles to a fair trial.1 43
Against the private interest of the litigant must be weighed the public
interest.
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a bur-
den that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which watch affairs of many per-
sons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than
139. See Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 136, at 60 ("Thus, even where subject matter and in
personam jurisdiction exist, a court may nevertheless dismiss an action where a balancing of interests
of the litigants and the forum reveals that it would not be 'convenient' to have the case tried in that
forum.").
140. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 271 ("A number of court of appeals judges have deplored
the lack of consistency and predictability and called for a reformulation of this body of law.").
141. 330 U.S. 501 (1946).
142. See id at 506-7.
143. See id at 508.
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in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only....
There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with state law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws,
and in law foreign to itself.144
Thus public factors focus in on the choice of law141 issue and the burden
placed on the Court's docket by cases outside its territorial discretion
while private factors emphasize considerations of convenience to individ-
ual litigants. The Gilbert Court concluded that ".... unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed."" 4 The Gilbert standard, with its presumption in
favor of plaintiff's choice of forum made corporations amenable to suits
by foreign plaintiffs, at district courts discretion in jurisdictions where
the corporation maintained continuous business operations.
Forum non conveniens doctrine was significantly altered by the
Court in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.147 The Court held that the plain-
tiff's choice of forum should not be accorded substantial deference when
the plaintiff is a foreign citizen attempting to benefit from liberal tort
rules designed to protect American citizens and residents. 148
Further, the Court determined that "adequate forum" does not
mean that the case should not be dismissed if the applicable law in the
alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff.
We do not hold that the possibility of an unfavorable change in law should
never be a relevant consideration in a forum non conveniens inquiry. Of
course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inade-
quate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in
law may be given substantial weight; the district court may conclude that
dismissal would not be in the interest of justice. 149
Finally, the Court discussed important public policy issues raised by this
country's interest in deterring sales of defective products and in provid-
ing a remedy to individuals injured by these products. The Court stated
that litigation of Piper in the United States would result in only "incre-
mental deterrence" and any value for curbing distribution of unsafe
products would be slight. Thus Piper establishes a hostile tone toward
foreign plaintiffs attempting to redress wrongs in U.S. courts by accord-
144. Id. at 508-9.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 508.
147. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
148. Id. at 242.
149. Id. at 254.
[Vol. 39
HAZARDOUS WASTE
ing less deference to their choice of forum, and placing strict limits on the
definition of adequate alternative forum.
Critics have attacked forum non conveniens as a doctrine reform. 1 0
Piper is used to justify the dismissal of a foreign plaintiff's claim with
minimal examination of the adequacy of the alternative forum or signifi-
cant public policy considerations underlying the refusal to hold corporate
defendants liable for their actions in developing nations. Thus, district
courts can use Piper to justify dismissal of a motion simply by distin-
guishing the facts and emphasizing certain public and private interests
over others. Likewise, district courts can use Piper to grant forum non
conveniens motions by stressing public interest in expediting court dock-
ets. Often, the important question of whether a foreign plaintiff can get
justice in U.S. courts depends upon how the particular district court
judge views the judiciary's role in shaping public policy. Presently, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens is a highly discretionary reflection of
judicial policy concerning the proper posture of the American judiciary
toward foreign plaintiffs injured by U.S. corporations. By granting fo-
rum non conveniens motions, the American judiciary gives tacit approval
to irresponsible acts of U.S. MNCs dumping hazardous waste abroad.
The doctrine is in need of revision. Foreign plaintiffs should have access
to substantial justice in the U.S. for harms caused by hazardous wastes
generated by U.S. MNCs and dumped in their territory.
The California doctrine of forum non conveniens provides an attrac-
tive alternative to the federal doctrine that validates illicit dumping.15'
California differs from the federal law in two important respects. Cali-
fornia adheres to the Gilbert rule according to substantial deference to
plaintiff's choice of forum. Secondly, California attaches significant im-
portance to the possibility of an unfavorable change in applicable law
occasioned by a forum non conveniens dismissal.15 ' Thus, there is a
strong presumption in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum and defendant
has the greater burden of proving plaintiff would not endure "substantial
disadvantage" by having to litigate in the alternate forum. Through re-
form of forum non conveniens doctrine federal courts would be in a posi-
tion to export justice to developing nations by allowing foreign plaintiffs
150. See Robertson, supra note 5, at 271.
151. See, eg., Holmes v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 156 Cal. App. 3d 372, 202 Cal. Rptr. 773
(1984).
152. Determining under California law that a suitable forum exists requires a showing that
plaintiff would not endure "substantial disadvantage" by having to litigate in the alternative forum.
Id. at 381, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79.
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to hold U.S. hazardous waste generators responsible for wastes they dis-
pose abroad.
Modern hazardous technology and wastes have arrived in develop-
ing nations without the corresponding structures necessary to compen-
sate victims of health and environmental tragedy often caused by them.
Often, the alternative forum for citizens of developing nations is a local
one that is not capable of providing the sophisticated procedures and
expertise necessary to handle harms occasioned by disastrous toxic torts.
U.S. MNCs, cognizant of this fact, seeking to dispose of hazardous waste
search the globe for developing nations with limited environmental and
health laws as well as limited recourse for holding the MNC liable in
their courts. Given this situation, citizens of LDCs injured by irresponsi-
ble waste disposal ought to be entitled to search out the most advanta-
geous legal forum for redress of grievances.
The U.S. judiciary has vast experience and expertise in dealing with
disastrous domestic toxic torts. LDCs should have access to the benefits
of our experience to remedy damages caused by U.S. MNCs involved in
illicit waste disposal.
Further, the American legal system, through the contingent fee
structure, is uniquely situated to aid LDCs in the event of environmental
disaster by creating among their citizens an expectation of recovery
where none existed previously. Through the contingent fee structure,
there is an incentive for American attorneys to become involved in toxic
torts cases arising out of illicit disposal of wastes by U.S. MNCs in devel-
oping nations. Although the attorney's personal motivation may not be
altruism, the positive results flowing to LDCs from this arrangement
should not be underestimated. Thus, the American judiciary, common
law and legal system are uniquely situated to impose liability upon
MNCs and bring about a swift end to the practice of illicit and irrespon-
sible hazardous waste disposal in developing nations. The spectre of lia-
bility in U.S. courts and the threat of being hit in the pocketbook would
cause U.S. MNCs to reevaluate their current policies of externalizing
costs of responsible waste disposal by dumping on developing nations.15 3
Liability in U.S. federal court would also raise the consciousness of de-
veloping nations and their populace. 154 Governments of LDCs could
153. See Foreign Firms Feel Impact of Bhopal, supra note 129, at A24, col. v; see also Galanter
infra note 154, at 291 n. 91 ("Lawyers who file multimillion dollar lawsuits are the consciences [sic]
of corporations. They whisper in their ears in a language they understand. So quit thinking of them
as vultures.").
154. See Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Trag.
[Vol. 39
HAZARDOUS WASTE
learn valuable lessons in protecting the health and environment of their
territories. Their citizens would be empowered and realize that there is
recourse for environmental disasters that cause injury and death.15
VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. MNCs have demonstrated their willingness to avoid regulation
and liability by disposing of hazardous waste in developing nations that
may not be able to manage it responsibly. U.S. regulations dealing with
hazardous exports are designed only to ensure that developing nations
make informed decisions about importing wastes into their territories.
LDCs are free to accept wastes from U.S. MNCs attempting to avoid
high disposal costs and liability at home. Advocating the wholesale ex-
port of U.S. domestic waste laws is an inadequate solution. International
law is currently incapable of dealing with the problem. Despite the inad-
equacy of U.S. hazardous waste legislation and International agreements,
they provide an excellent foundation for the proposition that U.S. MNCs
generating toxic waste should be held liable for damages caused by waste
they export to developing nations. This situation puts federal courts in a
position to close the loophole created by U.S. regulations and Interna-
tional law by allowing foreign plaintiffs a cause of action under common
law theories of liability against U.S. waste dumpers. The doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens must be modified so that meritorious claims by citi-
zens of LDCs are not dismissed by judicial whim.
JEFFERY D. WILLIAMS
edy, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 273, 291-92 (1985). India is a nation where dangerous conditions and disas-
ters abound. Until Bhopal and the arrival of the American tort remedy system, there were very low
standards of accountability applied to government, employers and property owners. The presence of
the American lawyer has created the expectation of aggressive action to redress harms and has
"raised consciousness and created bargaining power." Id
155. See id.
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APPENDIX A.
WASTE TRADING COMPANY*
The following firms have been reported to be engaged in the international
waste trade. This list does not include firms involved in waste trade be-
tween industrialized countries.
Name of Company Location of Co. Countries of Intended
Import
Acme Metal Enterprise
Admirality Pacific
Agro-Industrial
Development Co.
Alfred Hempel
Altos Homes
Allied Technologies
Amalgamated Shipping
American Cyanimid
American Security Int'l
Applied Recovery Tech.
Arbuckle Machinery
Armco Steel
Ashland Metal Co.
Astur Metals
Atlantic Forest Prod.
Axim Consortium Group
Bauwerk A.G.
Bayerischen Lloyd
Bayou Steel Corp.
Bergsoe Metal Corp.
Bis Import-Export
Boeing
Border Steel Mills
Bulkhandling Inc. (part
of Klaveness)
Buyuktemitz
Chapparral Steel
Chemical Marketing Co.
Chief Chemical and
Supply Co.
Chimica
Coastal Carriers
Cogema
Taiwan
U.S.
U.S.
West Germany
Mexico
U.S.
Bahamas
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Luxembourg
Austria
U.S.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
U.S.
Norway
Turkey
U.S.
Zimbabwe
U.S.
Romania
U.S.
France
Taiwan
Marshall Islands
Dominican Republic
China
Mexico
Brazil, Morocco
Haiti, numerous
countries
South Africa
Argentina, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay
Belize, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras,
Turkey, & Caicos
Dominican Republic
Mexico
Brazil
Brazil
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Congo
Turkey
Mexico
Pakistan, South
Korea, Taiwan
Guinea-Bissau
South Pacific region
Mexico
Guinea, Haiti,
Panama
Turkey
Mexico
Zimbabwe
Mexico
Romania
Haiti, numerous
countries
Benin
* Reprinted by permission of Greenpeace U.S.A. J. Valette, The International Trade in Wastes:
A Greenpeace Inventory (Jan. 30, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
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Colbert, Jack & Charles
Cultivators of the West
Czechoslovakia Ocean
Delatte Metals
Denison Mining
Diamong Shamrock
Dumba International
Dyno-Cyanimid
Eckernfoerde
Eco-Therm
Ecodeco
El Paso
Elite Shipping Co.
Elma
Emvratex
Environmental Pacific
Etrano Electro
Euro-Citrus
Export Waste
Management
Faesa
Federated Metals
Flexum Communal
Enterprise
Fort Dauplin Co.
Franklin Energy
Resources
G Systems
G.E.I.
Gebrueder Convalexius
Global Telesis
B.F. Goodrich
Gruppo Montedison
Guyana Resourse Corp.
Hamilton Resources
Hancock Industries
Hobday Ltd.
Houston Scrap
I.C.I.
Industrial Minera
Mexico SA
Institute Mexicano de
Inutstigaciones
Siderurgica
Intercontrat S.A.
International Asphalt
International Energy
Resources
U.S.
Haiti
Czech.
U.S.
Canada
U.S.
U.K.
Norway
West Germany
U.S.
Italy
U.S.
Denmark
Italy
U.K.
U.S.
Mexico
Netherlands
U.S.
Brazil
U.S.
Hungary
Haiti
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Austria
U.S.
U.S.
Italy
Guyana
U.K.
U.S.
U.K.
U.S.
Italy
Mexico
Mexico
Switzerland
U.S.
U.S.
India, Nigeria, South
Korea, Zimbabwe
Haiti
Lebanon
Brazil
Gabon
Mexico
Sierra Leone
Nigeria
Turkey
Costa Rica
East Germany
Mexico
Turkey
Nigeria
Equatorial Guinea
China, Hong Kong,
Philippines
Mexico
Nigeria
Congo, Guinea
Brazil
Mexico
Hungary
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Mexico
Senegal
Panama
Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands
Mexico
Nigeria
Guyana
Guinea-Bissau
Costa Rica
Guinea-Bissau
Brazil
Nigeria
Mexico
Mexico
Guinea-Bissau,
Senegal
Honduras
Panama
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International Recoveries
Interspace Products
Inver
Iruekpen Construction
Interspace Products
Jelly Wax
Jiminez, Dr. Enrique
Jordan National Shipping
Kimika
King LUn Shing Metals
Kraftwerk Union
LPT Development
Ladriller de Mexico
Lanvik Pigmentfabrikk
Lily Navigation
Lindaco Ltd.
M.L.S.A.
Marcona Shipping
Mercantil Lemport S.A.
Metales Potosi
Metalugica Bitury
Mine Tech International
Mineralimpex
Monochem (now Borden)
Montenay Glen Cove
Corp.
Mssrs. S.I. Ecomar
Mulltrans
Multidyne
National Waste
Contractors
Nedlog Technology
Nucor Steel
Nukem
Nugent, Clarence
Omega Recovery Services
P.P.G. Industries
Poon Village Non-
Ferrous Metals
Smelting Works
Potts Industries
Power, Water and Waste
Processamento de
Residuos Industrias
Quanex
Philippines
U.S.
Italy
Nigeria
U.S.
Italy
Mexico
Jordan
Liechtenstein
Taiwan
West Germany
U.S.
Mexico
Norway
Liberia
U.S.
Italy
U.S.
Panama
Mexico
Brazil
Netherlands
Hungary
U.S.
U.S.
Italy
Austria
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
West Germany
Mexico
U.S.
U.S.
China
U.S.
U.K.
Portugal
Philippines
Congo
Nigeria
Nigeria
Congo
Djibouti, Greece,
Nigeria, Lebanon,
Syria, Venezuela
Mexico
Turkey
Romania
Taiwan
China
American Samoa,
Philippines,
Western Samoa
Mexico
Nigeria
Numerous countries
Guinea-Bissau
Nigeria
Haiti, numerous
countries
Venezuela
U.S.
Brazil
Surinam
Hungary
Mexico
Peru
Nigeria
Hungary
Czechoslovakia,
Panama
Bahamas, Belize,
Mexico
Chile, Sierra Leone
Mexico
China
Mexico
Papua New Guinea
Mexico, Nigeria
China
Belize, Guyana
Netherlands Antilles,
U.K.
Guinea-Bissau
South Africa
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Razorback Steel
Recycled Energy Inc.
Review Ave. Enterprises
Ricoh Electronics
Roldiva Corp.
S.O.P.
Samin
Serviyi Industriali
Sesco Ltd.
Sheffield Steel
Societe Congolaise de
Recuperation de
Dechets Industrial
Sodilo
Sogaben (Societe
Gabonese d'Etudes
Nucleaire)
Steward Environmental
Systems Co.
Sulinade Metals
T.R.W.
Teixeria Farms
Thai Ping Metal
Thor Chemicals
Tito Nemenzo
Transnuclear (Nukem
subsidiary)
Ultramar Agencia
Martima Ltd.
Van Santen
Varn Products
Vinzenz Wagner
Waste Central Inc.
Waste Enterprise
Weirton Steel
World Resource
Recovery and
Congeneration
World Technology Co.
Zatec
Zinc Macional
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
West Germany
Syria
Italy
Gibraltar/U.K./
South Africa
U.S.
Congo
Senegal
Gabon
U.S.
Brazil
U.S.
U.S.
Taiwan
South Africa
Philippines
West Germany
Chile
Netherlands
U.K.
Austria
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Italy
Netherlands
Mexico
Mexico
Philippines
Bahamas, Belize,
Mexico
Philippines
Senegal
Morocco, Mauritania
Syria
East Germany
Benin
Mexico
Congo
Senegal
Gabon
Haiti
Brazil
Costa Rica
Belize, Guyana
Taiwan
South Africa
Philippines
China
Chile
Congo, Niger
Nigeria
Turkey
Netherlands Antilles
Bahamas, Belize,
Mexico
Mexico
Tonga
Dominican Republic
Africa (regional)
U.S.
1991]
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APPENDIX B.
WASTE TRADING SHIP INDEX**
The following vessels have been reported to be involved in the interna-
tional waste trade.
Name of Vessel
Al Karameh
Arctic Trader
Arktis Trader
Bark
Barn Luck
Banja
Danix
Deepsea Carrier
Juergen Vesta Denise
Karin B
Khian Sea
Line
Lynx
Makiri
Petersberg
Radhost
Vorais Spriades
(formerly Jumbo
Trust)
Yvonne/A.
Zanoobia
For more information about these
vessels' travels, see these countries
Turkey
Nigeria
Turkey
Guinea
Nigeria
Guinea, United States
Nigeria
Italy, Nigeria
Nigeria
Italy, Nigeria, United Kingdom
Bahamas, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti,
Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka,
Yugoslavia
Nigeria
Djibouti, Venezuela
Syria, Venezuela
Romania, Turkey, West Germany
Lebanon, Venezuela
Lebanon
Lebanon
Italy, Greece
** Reprinted by permission of Greenpeace U.S.A., J. Valette, The International Trade in
Wastes: A Greenpeace Inventory (Jan. 30, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
